docs/mqtt-app-user-auth.md records what future sessions (and whoever builds the phone app) need and can't get from the code alone: - app connection contract: username app_<uid>, Firebase ID token as password, client id prefix app_<uid>_, TLS only, allowed topics per acc, - serial field (serial_number, legacy device_id) and the device_serials mirror + every code path that must keep it in sync, - the uid-field lookup rule and ACL cache invalidation, - legacy "vesper" password flag and its log line, - rollout checklist: backfill, go-auth VPS config (required/recommended), files-ACL check, TLS listener, - decisions/gaps: FlutterFlow must sync device_serials itself; the device_users subcollection is intentionally ignored. CLAUDE.md gets a short section pointing agents at it before they touch MQTT auth or anything that edits user_list/status. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MQTT Authentication for Phone-App Users
Why this exists
The remote phone app (FlutterFlow + Firebase Auth) talks to Vesper boards over MQTT. We did not want to create an MQTT account per app user, so app users log into Mosquitto with their Firebase identity, and the Console backend decides what each one may do, based on which devices are assigned to them.
Mosquitto uses mosquitto-go-auth with two backends:
- files (passwd file on the VPS):
admin,bonamin,NodeRED. - http (this Console):
POST /mqtt/auth/user(on CONNECT) andPOST /mqtt/auth/acl(on SUBSCRIBE, PUBLISH and every message delivery). Code:backend/mqtt/auth.py,backend/mqtt/app_users.py.
The Mosquitto / go-auth config lives on the VPS, not in this repo.
Connection contract for the app (read this if you build the app)
| Setting | Value |
|---|---|
| Username | app_<firebase_uid> |
| Password | The user's current Firebase ID token (getIdToken()) |
| Client ID | Must start with app_<firebase_uid>_, e.g. app_<uid>_<installId> |
| Transport | TLS only (mqtts:// 8883 or wss://): the password is a bearer token |
| Wildcards | Not allowed (+ / # are denied) |
Any other client ID is refused on every topic. The prefix rule stops one user from reusing another user's client ID to kick them off.
Allowed topics, only for serials assigned to that user:
| Action | acc |
Topics |
|---|---|---|
| Publish | 2 | vesper/{serial}/control/command |
| Subscribe / receive messages | 4 / 1 | vesper/{serial}/control/ack, vesper/{serial}/status/heartbeat, vesper/{serial}/status/playback |
Everything else is denied (403).
Token lifetime: Mosquitto checks the password only at CONNECT. When the app
reconnects, it must fetch a fresh ID token (getIdToken() refreshes an expired one).
A connection stays open past token expiry. Blocking or unassigning still takes effect
on that connection, because every publish or delivery goes through the ACL (within
about 60 s of the go-auth ACL cache).
Which field is the device serial
The serial in vesper/{serial}/... is the device doc's serial_number: it is
flashed into NVS and the firmware uses it as its MQTT id. Legacy docs only have it in
device_id. users.service.device_serial_of() holds that rule; always use it.
How access is decided
users/{doc}.device_serials: [string]lists the serials a user may reach. It mirrors the devices'user_listand is written in the same atomic Firestore batch by every Console path that editsuser_list:users.service.assign_device/unassign_devicePOST/DELETE /api/devices/{id}/user-list(device Manage tab)PUT /api/devices/{id}when the body containsuser_list(devices.service.update_device)
- Users are resolved by the
uidfield (a query), never by doc ID. Console- created users get random doc IDs (.add()); FlutterFlow uses the uid as the doc ID. - A user is refused when
status == "blocked". - Lookups are cached in-process for 60 s (
mqtt/app_users.py). Assign/unassign, update, block/unblock and delete callinvalidate(uid). If you add a new code path that changesuser_list,device_serialsorstatus, it must do the same. The cache is per process: if uvicorn ever runs multiple workers, invalidation only reaches one of them (entries still expire after 60 s). app_usernames never go through the device HMAC or the legacy password.
Legacy "vesper" password
Boards on pre-HMAC firmware still use the shared password vesper.
MQTT_ALLOW_LEGACY_PASSWORD (default true) controls it. It is only accepted for
device-shaped usernames. Each use is logged at WARNING, once per board per hour:
MQTT legacy password accepted for <serial> — board still on pre-HMAC firmware
When those lines stop appearing, set MQTT_ALLOW_LEGACY_PASSWORD=false.
Rollout checklist
-
Deploy the backend.
-
Backfill
device_serialsfor existing assignments (run it right after the deploy):cd backend python scripts/backfill_user_device_serials.py # dry run, writes nothing python scripts/backfill_user_device_serials.py --apply # writesIt only writes the
device_serialsfield onusersdocs. It is idempotent: a second run finds nothing to change. Until it runs, the Console shows existing users with no devices, and app users are denied everything. -
go-auth config on the VPS (R = required, r = recommended):
auth_opt_backends files, http # R files first, then http auth_opt_http_host <host reaching the backend> # R auth_opt_http_port 8000 # R auth_opt_http_getuser_uri /mqtt/auth/user # R auth_opt_http_aclcheck_uri /mqtt/auth/acl # R auth_opt_http_params_mode form # R endpoints read form fields; go-auth's default is json auth_opt_http_response_mode status # r auth_opt_http_method POST # r auth_opt_http_timeout 5 # r auth_opt_disable_superuser true # r no superuser endpoint exists or is needed auth_opt_cache true # r auth_opt_cache_type go-cache # r auth_opt_auth_cache_seconds 60 # r auth_opt_acl_cache_seconds 60 # r auth_opt_auth_jitter_seconds 10 # r auth_opt_acl_jitter_seconds 10 # r allow_anonymous false # R -
Check the files ACL file (
auth_opt_files_acl_path). go-auth allows a request if any backend allows it, so general rules in that file apply to app users too and bypass the per-device ACL. Only lines under auser admin/user bonamin/user NodeREDblock are safe. Apattern ...line, or atopic ...line placed before the firstuserline, applies to every user. Such lines must not covervesper/.... -
Enable a TLS listener in Mosquitto for the app (certificate on the VPS).
Known gaps / decisions
- FlutterFlow writes to
user_list. If the app changesuser_listdirectly in Firestore (e.g. a claim flow), it must also updatedevice_serialsthe same way (ArrayUnion / ArrayRemove of the serial on the user doc). Otherwise that user cannot reach the device over MQTT. The app owner will handle this in the app. - The
device_userssubcollection on devices (older way of recording device users, read first bydevices.service.get_device_users) is intentionally ignored by the backfill and the MQTT ACL. Left as is by decision. - The two Console assignment paths store
user_listentries in different formats (path strings vs DocumentReferences). This predates this work; all readers accept both. - ACL denies are logged at INFO, which is not shown by default. Auth denies and legacy-password logins are WARNING.
Tests
cd backend
pip install pytest # not in requirements.txt
python -m pytest tests
tests/test_mqtt_auth.py covers the auth and ACL endpoints.
tests/test_device_serials_sync.py covers the device PUT sync.
Firebase and Firestore are mocked.